The NRC’s Office of Enforcement (OE) recently issued an enforcement guidance memorandum (EGM) to reinforce the NRC’s Enforcement Policy (Policy) and earlier guidance on identifying and documenting findings and associated violations in inspection reports. The need for this EGM arose after OE became “aware that some inspection staff may be misinterpreting and misapplying” the Policy and guidance by documenting all issues of concern, regardless of significance.

The EGM rejects that inspection staff misinterpretation and makes it clear that the inspection program is not meant to document all findings (and associated violations). Instead, inspection findings and associated violations are to be identified and documented as specified in the Inspection Manual, which follows the Policy and earlier OE guidance. OE reinforcement of this violation documentation policy provides licensees with a basis for challenging inspector inclusion of low-level, non-safety-significant findings or violations in an inspection report.

The NRC recently issued an allegation guidance memorandum (AGM) to provide guidance on the handling of certain drug and alcohol fitness-for-duty (FFD) violations. The AGM directs that licensee-identified drug and alcohol FFD violations by nonlicensed individuals not be processed in the NRC’s allegation program. This guidance took effect immediately and will be incorporated into the Allegation Manual. The next revision of Management Directive (MD) 8.8 will also incorporate this guidance by adding “Licensee-identified [FFD] drug- and alcohol-related violations by nonlicensed individuals” to the list of concerns excluded from the definition of an “allegation.”

The AGM is the result of changes to Section 4.1 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy approved by the Commission on April 18, 2019. As we discussed at that time, an NRC Staff review found that for most FFD drug and alcohol violations, the licensees had identified the issue and conducted an internal investigation into the violation by the time the NRC received notification of the violation. Staff also found that licensees were imposing the penalties required by 10 CFR § 26.75 to appropriately disposition individual FFD drug and alcohol issues before most NRC investigations began.

Our immigration lawyers prepared a LawFlash that provides guidance regarding immigration status assessments. With the degree of scrutiny applied to H-1B petitions at an all-time high, it is important for employers, including those in the nuclear energy industry, to begin assessing their H-1B needs.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is requesting comments on whether there is a sufficient supply of molybdenum-99 (Mo‑99) to meet medical needs without the export of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the United States. Comments are due by December 27, 2019. The comments will support a certification that the secretary of Energy must submit in early 2020 pursuant to the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2211 (the Act). The content of this certification will determine whether the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will have authority to issue HEU export licenses for Mo-99 production in foreign research and test reactors.

According to the notice in the November 27 Federal Register, “Historically, the United States has not had the capability to produce Mo-99 domestically and, until 2018, imported 100 percent of its supply from international producers, some of which was produced using targets fabricated with proliferation sensitive HEU.” Congress passed the Act as part of a decades-long effort to ensure domestic availability of Mo‑99, which is used in medical diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. According to the notice, approximately 80% of all of these procedures depend on the use of technetium-99, a decay product of Mo-99. Importantly, Section 3174 of the Act amended the Atomic Energy Act to prohibit the NRC from issuing licenses to export HEU from the United States for purposes of medical isotope production, effective seven years from the date of enactment of the Act. The Act became law on January 2, 2013, and thus the ban on NRC export licenses is scheduled to go into effect in early 2020, unless it is extended through a certification from the Energy secretary.

As we reported last summer, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff is considering whether to prepare a Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for the construction and operation of advanced nuclear reactors (ANR GEIS). As part of that effort, the NRC announced in the Federal Register on Friday that it is now soliciting input from stakeholders.

The NRC believes that an ANR GEIS could (1) streamline the process for advanced nuclear reactor environmental reviews; and (2) determine which environmental impacts would result in essentially the same (generic) impact for many advanced reactors, and which ones would result in different levels of environmental impacts requiring a plant-specific analysis. Environmental reviews for advanced nuclear reactor licenses would incorporate the ANR GEIS by reference and provide site-specific information in a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, thereby streamlining the environmental review process.

Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) announced on October 30 that the malware “Dtrack” had been found on the administrative network of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) in early September 2019. KKNPP is the largest nuclear power plant in India, equipped with two Russian-designed VVER pressurized water reactors, each with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts. Both reactor units feed southern India’s power grid.

On November 4, KKNPP issued a press release stating that its reactors are operating normally and emphasizing that all critical systems for KKNPP and other NPCIL plants are “air-gapped and impossible to hack.” The term “air-gapped” is often used in the cybersecurity context to describe isolated control processing technologies or systems that are not connected to the internet or external networks, and are therefore considered safe from cyberthreats.

As noted in this article by Morgan Lewis antitrust lawyers, the role of antitrust laws in labor markets, including in the energy field, remains a key area of focus by enforcers, including the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. At a public workshop on competition in labor markets in September 2019, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim reaffirmed “that criminal prosecution of naked no-poach and wage-fixing agreements remains a high priority for the Antitrust Division.”

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) have been busy in recent weeks assessing issues related to the licensing of non-light water reactors (non-LWRs).

First, the NRC’s Division of Advanced Reactors transmitted a draft white paper titled “Non-Light Water Review Strategy” on September 30, 2019. As the title suggests, the white paper will “support the [NRC’s] review of applications for non-LWR designs submitted prior to the development of the technology-inclusive, risk-informed and performance-based regulatory framework . . . in 2027.” In so doing, the white paper describes both the contents of such applications and “an approach NRC staff may use to review the license basis information.”